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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume 55 November, 1953 Number 3
PUBLIC AND PUBLIC WELFARE PROPERTY
TAX EXEMPTION IN WEST VIRGINIA
ALBERT S. ABEL*
TRUE, there is nothing unusual and almost nothing of interest
for the development of legal theory in West Virginia's law on
property tax exemptions. True, all the relevant citations are
already assembled at the appropriate places in the code annota-
tions and the digests. Yet there are justifications for the unpre-
tentious discussion here proposed. The practising lawyer will
perhaps find useful a summary of the holdings and some observa-
tions on how they fit together (and where they fail to fit together).
The more speculative will perhaps find perspectives on the judicial
process in the way the interests contemplated as beneficiaries of
the exemptions and competing claims and demands have fared.
And the teacher of West Virginia tax law, alias the writer, will
certainly gain two badly needed class hours by assigning the article
for collateral reading instead of lecturing on the problem as
formerly.
The constitutional basis for exemption is phrased by way of
exception to the general command of equality and uniformity, as
qualified by the fourfold classification scheme, declaring "but
property used for educational, literary, scientific, charitable, or
religious purposes, all cemeteries, public property, the personal
property, including livestock, employed exclusively in agriculture
... and the products of agriculture ... while owned by the pro-
ducers may by law be exempted from taxation" while "household
goods to the value of two hundred dollars shall be exempted from
taxation."
2
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1W. VA. CONsT. Art. X, § 1.
2 Ibid. Italics supplied.
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This language is appreciably different" from the corresponding
provision in the 1863 constitution and radically unlike the Virginia
constitutional provision at the time of separation. The latter,
after the general prescription of uniformity, and directions, now
obsolete, as to the assessment and exemption of slaves, stated "..
other taxable property may be exempted from taxation by the vote
of a majority of the whole number of members elected to each house
of the general assembly."4 More than differences over slavery and
possibly more than the location of the Union and Confederate
forces in 1862, the rankling feeling that Virginia legislation and
administration had consistently given the western counties the short
end of the stick sparked the movement for separation. The reports
of the constitutional convention make it quite plain that, on this
specific matter of taxation, the feeling obtained generally that the
plenary legislative discretion had been so exercised as to discrim-
inate against western Virginia, inducing in the delegates a purpose
to restrict that discretion so as to preclude regional favoritism in
the new state.5 Accordingly the constitution particularized the
categories exemptable by specifying, after the routine equality
and uniformity clause, "but property used for educational, literary,
scientific, religious or charitable purposes, and public property,
may by law be exempted from taxation." Other aspects of the
taxation article were extensively debated but no attention was
directed to the listed members in the quoted clause except the
statement that they "are such as appear to be sanctioned by almost
universal usage and are conceded, I believe, every where to be
right and proper."
7
3 The only reference judicially made to the anterior constitutional history,
see State v. Kittle, 76 W. Va. 526, 531, 105 S.E. 775, 776 (1921), while apt and
adequate for the immediate case, is unilluminating on the general significance
of the change, which it somewhat tends to discount.
4 VA. CONST. Art. IV, § 23 (1852).
5 Chairman Paxton of the Committee on Taxation and Finance, reporting
that committee's proposed article to the convention, said, for instance, C I ()hilst
the ordinance of secession may have been the occasion of this new State
movement on the part of our people, I apprehend there can be little doubt
in the mind of any one that the fundamental cause for this division and
desire for a new state may be found in the injustice and oppression which
our people have suffered from unequal taxation, from oppressive taxation
and unequal representation. It appears to me, sir, in framing a new con-
stitution now for the people of West Virginia we should be particularly
careful to guard against the liability in future of the perpetration of any
such injustice on any portion of our own people." 3 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS
OF THE Fmsr CONSTITuTIONAL CONVENTION OF WEST VIRGINIA 55 (n.d.). Similar
views were voiced uniformly though somewhat less explicitly by other delegates
participating in the ensuing debate.
6 W.VA. CONST. Art. VIII, § 1 (1863).
7 Op. cit. supra note 5, at 56.
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In the 1873 convention, the Committee on Taxation and
Finance favored a much different approach. It placed the basic
exemption provision in a separate section, constitutionally directing
exemption of the included types of property rather than authoriz-
ing the legislature to extend exemptions, and rephrasing the list
of exempt categories so as to clarify and perhaps somewhat to
amplify them." Additionally the legislature was to be empowered
to exempt agricultural products in the hands of the producer "and
all other products of labor and capital . . . produced within the
state during the year preceding and remaining in the hands of the
producer". The Committee of the Whole was less ready to in-
novate. It substituted virtually the language of the 1863 constitu-
tion, only adding "all cemeteries" before the phrase "and public
property". In the form so approved by the Committee of the Whole,
the phrase entered into the constitution. 9
The record though obscure sheds some light on what the pro-
vision encompassed. Clearly it rejected the idea of constitutionally
established exemptions and left implementation to the legislature.
Clearly also it ruled out the policy of a tax subsidy to agricultural
and other private producers, confining its operation in the main to
the same eleemosynary and public institutions as the 1863 provision.
Apparently no real change from those embraced under the earlier
constitution was envisaged by either the proposal of the Committee
on Taxation and Finance or the text which emerged from the
Committee of the Whole. The almost universal usages which the
1863 constitution sought to connote would hardly have changed
much in ten years. The 1863 language was eventually unchanged
except for specification of "all cemeteries". This was probably
viewed as itemizing something ejusdem generis with the immediate-
ly preceding categories, for the rejection of an attempt to limit
the exemption to "public" cemeteries10 suggests that doubt existed
concerning the status .of the family burial plot, frequent in quiet
rural communities, rather than sentiment for an enlargement be-
yond conventionally accepted eleemosynary activities. The Taxa-
8 "2. The property of the State, counties, townships, and other munici-
pal corporations, both real and personal, and such other property as may
be used, or the proceeds of which may be used, exclusively for agricultural
or horticultural sodeties, for educational, literary, or scientific, religious or
charitable purposes, or for a public burial ground, shall be exempt from
taxation; but such property and use shall be determined in such manner
as the Legislature shall direct by general law, uniform as to the class to
which it applies."
) W. VA. CONST. Art. X, § 1 (1873).
10 See JOURNAL OF 1872 CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION 195.
3
Abel: Public and Public Welfare Property Tax Exemption in West Virginia
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1953
IVELFARE PROPERTY TAX
tion and Finance Committee's proposal had been limited to "a
public burial ground"" so the change showed clearly that the
convention was not disposed generally to confine the classes of
public welfare beneficiaries more narrowly than was the committee.
Nor was the latter apparently espousing curtailment of the state of
affairs existing under the 1863 constitution, for its proposal failed
to reflect, it is to be assumed after due deliberation by the Com-
mittee, a delegate's motion referred to it which would have con-
fined permissible exemptions to property "used for charitable and
religious purposes",1 2 thus inferentially excluding from exemption
public property and that used for educational, literary, and scien-
tific purposes. On the whole it seems legitimate to view the 1863
provision, the Taxation and Finance Committee proposal, and the
final 1873 provision as having the same content except for elimina-
tion of doubt as to the status of family burying grounds. The
committee's proposal was more verbose and cumbersome; and that,
as well as a conservative impulse of adherence to familiar terminol-
ogy, told against it. But there is nothing in the record which
indicates that the proposal was not in substance a statement of
those categories "sanctioned by almost universal usage and . . .
conceded ... everywhere to be right and proper", which were to be
legislatively exemptable under the 1863 phrasing. Except for
the family burial plots, they probably were regarded as expressing
essentially the same content. If so, the mention of "property...
the proceeds of which may be used exclusively"'13 for the designated
objects has a relevance which will appear in connection with the
review hereafter of the decisions.
There has been one further constitutional change. As a part of
the extensive revision of 193214 by the Tax Limitation Amendment,
setting up the fourfold classification scheme and authorizing a
graduated income tax, there was included for the first time a consti-
tutionally mandatory exemption, household -goods of two hundred
dollars value, and two more legislatively exemptable categories were
added, "personal property, including livestock, employed exclusive-
ly in agriculture ... and the products of agriculture ... while owned
by the producer". Institution of a constitutional exemption.
whether motivated by the judgment that the revenues foregone
did not justify the administrative cost and effort of collection, or
11 See note 8 supra.
12 See JOURNAL OF 1872 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 53.
13 See note 8 supra.
14 See W. Va. Acts Ex. Sess. 1932, c. 9. This amendment was ratified by
the voters at the 1932 general election.
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more probably, by hopes of political ingratiation, was a complete
departure from the consistent tradition of legislatively exemptable
-in contrast with constitutionally exempt-property. The tax sub-
sidy to agriculture, with its tardy qualified 'approval of the view
of the 1873 convention's Committee on Taxation and Finance, was
only somewhat less of an innovation. No doubt both changes are
permissible under the federal constitution.- Neither has been the
basis for any reported decision. In themselves they have no bear-
ing on the problem under investigation here, the scope of the
exemption for public property and for primarily public welfare
enterprises. As a matter of sentence structure, however, the addi-
tion of one more item after cemeteries, themselves added to public
property, tends to make the categories of exemptables break in two
in the middle. Superficially read, without remembering the pro-
vision's history, there appears to be one subgroup where the inquiry
focuses primarily on the nature of the use and a second where that
is relatively immaterial and the character of the property is all
important. Such obscurities consequent to haphazard growth are
an open invitation to questionable construction.
Public property has aspects which make its separate considera-
tion appropriate. To tax the state's own property or that of its
subordinate divisions pretty much involves simply a wasteful trans-
fer from one civic pocket to another. To tax that of the federal
government offends the supreme law of the land as construed by
the United States Supreme Court.16 These peculiarities have in-
fluenced legislative and judicial treatment of this category of
property.
The code makes refined distinctions based on the character of
the proprietor government. All "property belonging to the United
States, other than property permitted by the United States to be
taxed under state law" is exempt; but tax immunity derives from
the state only with respect to property "belonging exclusively" to
it while, as to municipal, county, and such like property, there
must be not only this exclusive ownership but the property must
be used for public purposes. 17 As to property of the federal gov-
15 For the constitutional validity of prescribing quantitative minima as
a condition to tax liability, see Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301
U.S. 495 (1937); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927). As
to distinctive treatment of personal property used in agriculture and the pro-
ducts of agriculture, including livestock, see Charleston Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182 (1945).
"5 United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Van Brocklin
v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886).
17 W. VA. CoDE c. 11, art. 3, § 9 (Michie, 1949).
5
Abel: Public and Public Welfare Property Tax Exemption in West Virginia
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1953
WELFARE PROPERTY TAX
ernment, the question is one of power; as to the state's, of title;
as to that of political subdivisions, of concurrent title and use.
Nothing is said about the property of sister states and their subdivi-
sions but exempting the property of "the" state"' and, even more
distinctly, the property of any county, town, et cetera "in this State"
implies that they are to be treated no differently than private
owners. While there are no West Virginia cases in point, the isola-
tionist attitude of the Supreme Court of Appeals in another con-
text19 and the majority doctrine that tax exemptions benefit only
the enacting state and its subdivisions, 20 even in cases where it
derives advantages from another state's enterprise located within
its borders,2 ' make it virtually certain that the provision would be
so construed.22 A contingency which seems not to have been consid-
ered is also at least theoretically relevant to property in which the
state or a subdivision has a property less than exclusive ownership.
There, as well as where a sister state or its municipalities are con-
cerned, though the statute makes the property no better off than
that which is privately owned, arguably it ought to make it no
worse off. It is not likely that there could be any such property
devoted to the purposes of religion but there might well be property
so owned devoted to some of the educational or eleemosynary ends
spelled out in the statute. If so, it would seem that its taxable
status should not suffer because the character of its ownership does
not meet the statutory specifications if the character of its use
meets the prescribed tests. It is, however, an open question that
would be held. So is the situation where the state and a municipal
or similar subdivision are co-owners. Since neither owns exclu-
sively, the statute literally read does not entitle such property to
18 The general code provision as to the construction of states, W. VA.
CODE c. 2, art. 2, § 10 (h) directs that "The word 'State' when applied to a
part of the United States and not restricted by the context includes the Dis-
trict of Columbia and the several Territories. . . " but use in conjunction with
the definite article would no doubt be deemed a restriction by the context
rendering this section inapplicable.
19 See Ferguson v. Townsend, 111 W. Va. 432, 162 S.E. 490 (1932). dis-
cussed infra p. 188.
202 COOLEY, LAW OF TAXATION § 634 (4th ed. 1924). But ef. Louisville
v. Babb, 75 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1935).
21See State ex. rel. Taggart v. Holcomb, 85 Kan. 178, 116 Pac. 251 (1911)
(denying exemption to a waterworks owned by Kansas City, Missouri, and
used co-operatively by the fire departments of that municipality and of Kansas
City, Kansas.) In such circumstances, at least, the state of the situs may by
valid interstate compact extend the exemption to the extrastate owner, State
ex rel. Baird v. Josln, 116 Kan. 615, 227 Pac. 543 (1924).
22As to taxation of municipally owned property located outside the muni-
cipality but within the state, see Stimson, The Exemption of Publicly Owned
Property from Taxation, 8 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 32, 37 (1934).
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exemption. It is almost unthinkable, however, that it would be
denied if between them such governmental owners shared the
whole title, at least if the property was being used for a public
purpose as would normally be the situation.
Turning from these unresolved statutory ambiguities to the
case law, one finds few if any surprises in the latter. There are
no decisions as to the state's own property. As to that of political
subdivisions on the one hand and of the federal government on the
other, the approach is superficially but probably not actually
divergent.
The two cases where the exemption urged traced to a munici-
pality display a manifest bias against extending exemptions. State
v. Page23 disallowed a claim of exemption from personal property
tax for privately owned securities consisting of district road and
school bonds and bonds of the city of Welch. The opinion stressed
the point that the code provision was as to public property, not pub-
lic securities. The latter, says the syllabus, "if not exempted from
taxation by law or by contract, are taxable ... in the same manner
as other property".24 It does not suggest that the state might not
exempt such property by apt legislation.2 5 Indeed the inference is
farily clear from the quotation that that possibility was assumed.
The amendment of the code, at the next session of the legislature, to
exempt "mortgages, bonds and other evidences of indebtedness in
the hands of bona fide owners and holders hereafter issued and
sold by churches and religious societies for the purpose of securing
money to be used in the erection of church buildings. . . "21 (a pro-
vision still in effect without ever having been judicially discussed)
appears to indicate a legislative reading to that effect. The absence
of a parallel provision for municipal bonds is a plain legislative
concurrence in the result of the Page case.
23 100 W. Va. 166, 130 S.E. 426 (1925).
24 Ibid., syllabus 4.
25 In Bates v. State Bridge Comm'n, 109 W. Va. 186, 153 S.E. 305 (1930),
sustaining the constitutionality of W. Va. Acts 1929, c. 8, which established the
Commission, the court stated, id. at 189, 153 S.E. at 307, that a provision in
section 7 of the Act exempting from taxation bonds issued by the Com-
mission was constitutional and that without it the bonds would have been
taxable, citing the Page case. The statement is however only weak author-
ity and perhaps only dictum, since the case did not involve any bonds of
the Commission but arose out of a contest by persons whose property the Com-
mission was condemning under the grant of the power of eminent domain, the
tax exemption question while duly certified for review was not briefed (nor
apparently discussed) by counsel, and the Act contained a standard "separ-
ability" clause, section 16, apparently adequate to disable individuals situated
as the contestants there were from gaining any benefit even had the tax
exemption provision as to the bonds been unconstitutional.
20 W. Va. Acts 1927, c. 14.
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. That result was of course orthodox enough27 that even the
taxpayer's counsel can hardly have been greatly surprised. Greene
Line Terminal Co. v. Martin2 8 presented a much nicer question but
here again the claim of exemption was denied.
The city of Huntington owned in fee a wharf which it seems
at one time also to have operated. Shortly after the turn of the
century, however, its operation as a public wharf was turned over
to appellant's assignor under a fifty year "lease" providing for pay-
ment to the city of an annual license fee and of all the proceeds
above a percentage retained as "commission" as shown by an
accounting. After some twenty years, the assignment to appellant
was made and a little later the "lease" was modified to reduce the
license fee and excuse appellant assignee from the accounting. The
whole net proceeds seem to have accrued thenceforth to appellant
which, in conjunction with the wharf, owned and operated a ware-
house connected with it by an inclined plane. Taxes were assessed
and paid on these associated parts of the enterprise but none on
the value of the leasehold interest until 1989 when, at the Tax
Commissioner's direction, the county court entered it for taxes for
that and the four preceding years. The company's contention was,
essentially, that it was to be treated as the municipal alter ego in
the operation of the wharf, enjoying the same exemptions as the
city would have had the latter elected to have persons on the
municipal payroll run it. The city, it was asserted, had merely
exercised a discretion as to the manner in which public wharfage
was regulated and the form of the regulation created no taxable
property. This claim that all that was involved was an election
as to the mode of regulation, giving rise to no taxable proprietary
incident, is reminiscent of that advanced in South Carolina v.
United States29-and proved equally unavailing.
If the holding had been that the existence or creation of any
third party interest at all in a parcel of property destroyed the
exclusiveness of ownership requisite for municipal exemption, the
doctrine, while strict, would have been clear cut. Or if the court
had been prepared to assert that operation of an enterprise by a
private person was per se inconsistent with use for a public purpose,
an obvious basis for denying the exemption would have emerged
27 2 CooLEY, op. cit. supra note 20, § 628. There is some conflict among
the states, depending in considerable measure on variations in constitutional
language, but the result in West Virginia apparently conforms with the
majority position, see Notes 26 A.L.R. 547 (1923), 44 A.L.R. 501 (1926).
2S 122 W. Va. 488, 10 S.E.2d 901 (1940).
29 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
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although with consequential difficulties-chief among them, per-
haps, the reconciliation of such a proposition with any theory which
would permit exercise of the power of eminent domain by public
utilities. Moreover, the natural (although not quite the necessary)
upshot of either such position would have been to divest the whole
property of the exemption, so rendering assessable the city's free-
hold as well as the operator's leasehold interest. This the court
was not prepared to do. Indeed, the opinion expressly characterized
the wharf as "city property in public use" 30 and declared obiter
that such public use relieved the city from tax liability. How, then,
could the lessee be held taxable, as it was, if the two legislative
conditions, exclusive proprietorship and public use, were concur-
rently satisfied? Of course the quite ordinary technique of judicial
legislation supplies the answer. The court started its reasoning
from the indisputable proposition that leaseholds are separately
assessable in West Virginias' and without much trouble concluded
that the operator's interest in the wharf was a leasehold rather
than, as was contended, a franchise. All this, however, only got
the court to, not through the real difficulty. While our tax system
undoubtedly contemplates the allocation of taxable values among
persons with divided property interests in assessable realty, it does
not logically follow that a division of interests generates assessability
where none existed before-and furthermore generates it differen-
tially so that some of the resultant divided interests are taxable
and others are not. Instead of essaying to grapple with the logical
difficulties, the opinion added to the legislative prescriptions of
exclusive ownership and public purpose use, a third element
applicable to the estates or interests of individuals in publicly
owned property, that they are taxable if exercised "on a personal
profit basis, though public convenience is thereby served".32
This judicial supplement permits the dismemberment of the
complex of claims and demands which all together comprise the
property rights in any particular res, so as to retain tax immunity
for so much as may be formally in public proprietorship while
denying it to associated claims of private persons in the same res.
No comparable isolation of the elements of substantive economic
value seems possible. As obligor marketing its securities, as lessor
demising its realty, or in any kindred capacity, a political subdivi-
so See Greene Line Terminal Co. v. Martin, 122 W. Va. 483, 488, 10 S.E.2d
901, 905 (1940).
31W. VA. CODE c. 11, art. 5, § 4 (Michie, 1949); cf. id., c. 11, art. 4, § 9
(assessment of undivided interests).
32 See Greene Line Terminal Co. v. Martin, supra note 30, at syllabus 1.
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sion logically should be and in all probability would be in a
position to obtain better terms if rights derived from it were taken
free of tax liabilities. Denial of that attribute shifts the tax burden
to such subdivision in the sense of disabling it from making as
advantageous bargains as it might if exemption were allowed.
While no recognition of this substantive effect was voiced in either
the Page or the Greene Line case, the court has elsewherea revealed
its awareness of business realities and their relevance to sustain
constitutionally a grant of exemption when the legislature sees fit
to declare one. The "public property" which the legislature is
constitutionally authorized to exempt would thus seem not to be
limited by the conditions of exclusive ownership or of use for a
public purpose which the statute in fact expresses, if the factor
of economic impact has a capacity for sustaining exemption. But
that factor will be given no independent judicial recognition, for
interpreting what the legislature has exempted, at least in the
absence of explicit provision. Instead a judicially contrived doc-
trine that subsidiary interests of individuals in public property
are taxable whenever they are appreciably employed for the pur-
pose of private gain is enforced. This does not represent a repudia-
tion of the existence of a public interest of substance14 under the
circumstances but an election to subordinate it to certain individual
interests supposed to form part of the context of a laissez faire
economy, which have been more forcefully expounded in some of
the charitable exemption cases in reviewing which they will be
discussed in due course. At this point it must suffice to remark
that the court is reluctant to let an entrepreneur obtain a preferred
position vis-a-vis potential competitors by being relieved from tax
liabilities to which they are subject and will not do so unless it
finds an unequivocal legislative command.
At first blush, the propositions in the preceding paragraph
seem to be belied by and the law of the cases thus far examined
to be inconsistent with the course of decision in situations in-
volving exemptions claimed because of a federal nexus with the
property affected. Thrice exemption has been claimed and thrice
sustained.
The earliest case excused from taxation a vendee in possession
of realty under the United States, which still held legal title and
33 See Bates v. State Bridge Comm'n, 109 W. 4/a. 186, 189, 153 S.E. 305,
307 (1930).
3 4
POUND, OUTLINE OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 103 (5th ed. 1943).
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a vendor's lien for unpaid instalments of the purchase price.35
(There had been no default and there was no suggestion of pros-
pective default).
The other two 36 were much alike and quite complex. Both
involved the operation of federal grant-in-aid programs, one under
the United States Housing Act of 1937,3 7 the other under the
Federal Airport Act of 1946.38 In neither was the United States
a predecessor in the chain of title or in any manner connected with
the specific property involved except as contributor of funds for
its acquisition which acquisition was, however, in each instance
pursuant to and integrated with a program federally conceived and
whose basic conditions were federally prescribed. In both, record
title was to be in and operations conducted by a special statutory
"authority" created by state legislation, so presenting some overlap
with the problem of exemptions tracing to the state's political sub-
divisions. Since the state legislation in both instances provided for
tax exemption and since in both the court was willing to accept
the "authority" 's operations as constituting a public purpose and
its holding as being ownership by a public corporation, 9 the
opinions might conceivably have ignored the federal relationship
involved and proceeded as simple expositions of the tax immunities
attributable to political subdivisions of the state. Their failure
to do so and the invocation of the federal relationship, in the
earlier case distinctly,40 in the later by reference, 41 are highly
suggestive.
If the court had been content to treat the question purely as
one of tax exemptions of political subdivisions, it would not have
overruled any earlier law. It would, however, have had to lay
35 Copp v. State, 69 W. Va. 439, 71 S.E. 580 (1911).
30 Chapman v. Huntington Housing Authority, 121 W. Va. 318, 3 S.E.2d
502 (1939); Meisel v. Tri-state Airport Authority, 135 W. Va. 528, 64 S.E.2d 32(1951).
3750 STAT. 888 (1937), 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1946).
38 60 STAT. 170, 49 U.S.C. § 1101 (1946).
39 That one of the six constituent bodies, with the right to appoint one
of the nine members of the Authority, was a private non-profit corporation, all
the others being public bodies, was held not to deprive the Authority of the
status of a "public corporation" in Meisel v. Tri-State Airport Authority, 135
W. Va. 528, 64 S.E.2d 32 (1951).
40 Chapman v. Huntington Housing Authority, 121 W. Va. 319, 348, 3
S.E.2d 502, 516 (1939).
41 Meisel v. Tri-State Airport Authority, 135 W. Va. 528, 544, 64 S.E.2d
31, 41 (1951) stated only that "this case is controlled on the question of tax
exemption by the decision in Chapman v. Huntington Housing Authority,
supra, and from the position taken therein this Court does not depart."
11
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down the principle, certainly for the housing authority case, 2
that business enterprises conducted by governmental bodies in com-
petition with the ordinary business interests in the community are
exemptable as to the plant devoted to such activities, at least where
the operations are so far public in purpose as to permit them to be
governmentally conducted-a principle almost inevitably colliding
with the underlying premise of the Greene Line case. Any such
general commitment could be avoided, however, to the extent that
reliance was placed on the interest of the federal government.
Where such an interest is present, indeed, our court's view has been
that it is so transcendent that exemption traces not to the legislative
grant-which, of course, the code expresses and has all along ex-
pressed-but to legislative impotence to tax.43 By investing a situa-
tion with the majesty of federal interests beyond the state's legisla-
tive grasp, considerations are adduced which distinguish it from
situations parallel in every respect except that the United States
does not enter the picture at any point. Moreover, invocation of
that distinction strongly implies that in those analogous situations
the court will not be disposed to accord the exemption. The
governing principle is that of "exemption by association" if the
associate happens to be the United States.
It is perhaps worthy of note that the airport case was decided
flatly on the authority of the housing case without adverting to
the fact that, while the United States Housing Act required as a
condition for federal aid that the housing development be relieved
from state taxes, the state's exemption in the airport case was
volunteered, there being apparently no such condition stated in
either the Federal Airport Act or the regulations under it.44 It is
stretching the argument mighty far to derive tax exemptions for
federal collaterals from a constitutional touch-me-not policy and
then to apply the derivation to a case where the related federal
program has not seen fit either by statute or by regulation to con-
dition the federal grant on tax immunity. That our court has so
42 Not only is the rental of residential realty a common. income-producing
activity of individuals but the opinion in Chapman v. Huntington Housing
Authority affirmatively discloses, see 121 W. Va. at 422, 3 S.E.2d at 504, that the
challenge to the validity of the Act was raised by a plaintiff who owned
and was engaged in the rental of competitive housing units. Airports, of
course, are less generally operated as competitive businesses, partaking rather
of the character of "natural monopolies"; but that is also true, at least under
such geographic and demographic circumstances as were in fact present, of
wharves situated like that in Greene Line Terminal Co. v. Martin.
43 Copp v. State, 69 W. Va. 439, 443, 71 S.E. 580, 581 (1911).
44 For the governing administrative regulations implementing the statute,
see 14 CODE FED. REGS. § 550.1-11 (1952) .
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done heavily underscores its bifocal vision where the exemption
urged is and where it is not in some aspect federal. If it is, there
is extreme wariness in allowing taxation, extreme-perhaps un-
warranted-sensitiveness to the coercion of a supposed federal policy
that the property shall be exempt. Where not federally connected,
the court compensates with a vengeance. Then not only will there
be no construction to favor exemption, 4 ' there may even be a gloss
of conditions additional to those legislatively expressed so as to
deny exemptions unless the judicial policy favorable to laissez faire
is satisfied.
The law regarding pro bono publico enterprises is ampler and
more varied than that as to public property. The code's relatively
sparse provision as to the latter contrasts with the proliferating
itemization 0 of uses "for educational, literary, scientific, charitable
or religious purposes". In the case law, there is a similar dispro-
portion; but the ramifications are not necessarily clarifications.
The legislature has been disposed to a generous construction of
its authority to exempt, as witness its exercise in behalf of college
fraternities ("any college or university society")47 and the lodges of
Masonic and similar bodies ("benevolent associations") 4s, as to
45 It is a well-worn generality that statutes are to be construed to extend
taxability and limit exemptions, see 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 20, § 672.
40 W. VA. CODE C. 11, art. 3, § 9 (Michie, 1949) ("All property ... described
in this section, and to the extent herein limited, shall be exempt from taxation,
that is to say: . . . property used exclusively for divine worship; parsonages,
and the household goods and funiture pertaining thereto; mortgages, bonds,
and other evidence of indebtedness in the hands of bonafide owners and
holders hereafter issued and sold by churches and religious societies for the
purposes of securing money to be used in the erection of church buildings
used exclusively for divine worship or for the purpose of paying indebted-
ness thereon; cemeteries, property belonging to, or held in trust for, colleges,
seminaries, academies, and free schools, if used for educational, literary,
or scientific purposes including books, apparatus, annuities, money and furni-
ture; public and family libraries; property used for charitable purposes, and
not held or leased out for profit; all real estate not exceeding one-half acre
in extent, and the buildings thereon, and used exclusively by any college or
university society as a literary hall, or as a dormitory or club room, if not
leased or otherwise used with a view to profit; all property belonging to
benevolent associations, not conducted for private profit; property belonging
to any public institution for the education of the deaf, dumb, or blind, or
any hospital not held or leased out for profit; house of refuge, lunatic, or
orphan asylum; homes for children, or for the aged, friendless or infirm,
not conducted for private profit; fire engines and implements for extinguish-
ing fires, and property used exclusively for the safe-keeping thereof, and
for the meetings of fire companies .... ).
47 Such groups are not exempt in most states, see Chamberlin, Tax
Exemption of Greek Letter Fraternities, 4 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 186 (1930);
Cf. Comment, 23 IowA L. REv. 438 (1938) (fraternity building corporations).
48 This appears to be the general rule although with some exceptions in
states having more narrowly phrased statutes, see 2 CooLaY, op. cit. supra
note 20, § 764.
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each of which it has aligned itself on the less restrictive side of a
split of opinion among the states. By and large so has the court,
but with an unevenness which a review of prior decisions will in-
dicate-and which in turn may indicate the course of future
decision.
Once satisfied that a claimant comes fairly within a constitu-
tionally and legislatively specified category of beneficiaries and that
it holas the property for which exemption is claimed as property
devoted to the ends which entitle it to be so ranked, the court has
not quibbled over particulars of more or less so as to deprive the
claimant of leeway for flexible operation. Thus, in State v. Kittle,
41
premises held by trustees as a parsonage and occupied as such for
over a year but thereafter for fourteen years rented to lay persons
and the rentals applied to parish activities (the church evidently
being served by a supply pastor) were held to have been properly
omitted from assessment. Antecedent holding preparatory to the
appointed use or subsequent holding incident to advantageous dis-
position with as much expedition as could reasonably be exercised
were as effective as occupancy itself to sustain the exemption.bo
In Mountain View Cemetery Co. v. Massey,51 exemption as a
"cemetery" was allowed for an entire sixteen acre holding, on the
outskirts of Charleston, of which only three acres had been de-
veloped and even less sold, the rest being held as a reserve for
future development. Neither bad faith nor disproportion of amount
to prospective need appearing, the exemption accrued to all the
land in the project even though there was nothing to hinder the
owner's diverting the undeveloped portions to other purposes.
Prima fade these allowances of time and area margins would seem
equally valid for other exemption beneficiaries. One cannot be quite
positive, because the opinions laid some stress on the circumstance
that parsonages and cemeteries respectively are mentioned eo nomi-
ne in the statute, because the Kittle case hints at a differentiation
between parsonages and property whose exemption is phrased in
terms of its use,5 2 and because some mawkish language in the
49 87 W. Va. 526, 105 S.E. 775 (1921).
sold. at 533, 105 S.E. at 777 ("Unrestrained exemption of parsonages
clearly extends to property in course of preparation for such use and to
property in process of disposition, after discontinuance thereof, or held in
vacancy pending determination as to its ultimate disposition"); cf. Cole v.
State, 73 W. Va. 410, 80 S.E. 487 (1913) (vendor of church premises not
given possession of or deed to premises until 3 January not taxable although
contract was made the preceding November, the state s "tax day" being (P)
1 January).
51 109 W. Va. 473, 155 S.E. 547 (1930).
s See State v. Kittle, 87 W. Va. 526, 533, 105 S.E. 775, 777 (1921).
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Mountain View case might be read as according cemeteries also an
exceptional status. As against this, however, and strongly indica-
tive of a more generalized doctrine is the result in Reynolds Memo-
rial Hospital Ass'n v. Marshall County Court.53 The exemption
beneficiary there was a hospital whose operations were decided to
be charitable in nature. What is here pertinent is that the exemp-
tion was allowed not only as to the land occupied by hospital and
nursing school buildings but also as to other contiguous vacant
lots, some of which were used for hospital purposes and others
perhaps unused. No stress is laid on that circumstance in the
opinion which is, however, quite clear to the point that exemption
rested on the charitable nature of the beneficiary's activities. The
net effect would seem to be to rebut any inferences that might
be derived from casual expressions in the Kittle and Mountain View
cases limiting the principle to parsonages and cemeteries.' 4
It is not the law, however, that occupancy and use for exemp-
tion qualifying purposes of part of a parcel of realty will confer
exemption on the entire parcel owned by an eleemosynary body.
State v. McDowell Lodge No. 112, A.F. &c A.M.5 5 refused exemption
to a four story building, the upper two floors of which were used
for lodge purposes by the owner, a Masonic lodge, but the lower
two of which were rented out to individuals as ordinary income
producing property, even though the income was all applied to
paying the construction and maintenance charges of the building
and to the lodge's charitable objects. The situation is readily dis-
tinguishable from those in the Mountain View and the Reynolds
Memorial Hospital cases where the surplus land was simply held
for use in connection with present or prospective uses of the
exempted enterprise, not put on the rental realty market as a
source of income.58 It is more difficult to reconcile it with State
v. Kittle. The distinction proposed has already been alluded to,
namely, that parsonages are exempted in terms whereas the Masonic
lodge's exemption was conditioned on charitable user. It is re-
spectfully submitted that that distinction is illusory for, while it is
03 78 W. Va. 685, 90 S.E. 238 (1916).
4It may also be observed that, although both those cases were subsequent
to the Reynolds Memorial Hospital case, neither of them contains language
purporting to limit or distinguish it.
-5 96 W. Va. 611, 123 S.E. 561 (1924).
GO There may be economic unwisdom in a distinction which promotes re-
source waste by placing a premium on lands' standing idle or at any rate
not being applied to their highest and best use; but, if so, it is not peculiarly
a West Virginia phenomenon that elements of the tax structure-judicial,
legislative or constitutional-fall short of the economic ideal.
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true that the statute says nothing about the use of parsonages,"7
it rests on a constitutional provision, "property used for... religious
purposes" which fixes its allowable scope58 and which does men-
tion use. Moreover the result of "once a parsonage, always a par-
sonage" (at least until change of title) which would follow is one
which the court can hardly be seriously have supposed to intend.
A more tenable distinction between the Kittle and the McDowell
Lodge cases would seem to be that in the former the leasing was
only ad interim and incidental to a purpose of disposing of the
property when a suitable opportunity arose while in the latter
it was apparently designed as a continuing financing program.
Actually the difference in result probably represents an inarticulate
response to still a third and more fundamental consideration which
will later be adverted to in its appropriate place.
An interesting question raised by the McDowell Lodge case
but unanswered there or elsewhere in the West Virginia cases is
whether the lodge (or a comparable exempt activity) although not
entitled to exemption of the whole property could successfully
claim it pro tanto for that part of the property's value, e.g., the
value of the upper two stories, occupied by it and used for its
exemption conferring purposes. 59 The contention may well have
been unavailable in that case for it seems to raise issues of valua-
tion no longer available under the procedure which was resorted
to, instead of addressing itself to taxability only (though that too
is involved). Another even more puzzling question is possible if
separation is temporal rather than spatial, with the building let
out, say, as a convention hall at certain times but reserved for
lodge uses a stated number of days per week. 0 The problems of
valuation would be most perplexing but the questions are in-
57The common law requirement seems to have been that the parson
(or vicar) continue in residence at the parsonage, see I BL. CoMM. *392.
58 Differentiation of parsonages into a favored category might well raise
doubts on "First Amendment due process" grounds under the United States
Constitution, in view of the fact that the validity of property tax exemp-
tions for religious bodies seems to relate to their being assimilated with
other social welfare institutions, cf. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. v. Los
Angeles County, 181 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1950); see dissenting opinion of Reed,
J., in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 249 (1948).
59 The matter is fully treated in Note, 159 A.L.R. 685 (1945) which in-
dicates a general tendency to grant pro tanto exemption. But cf. Note, 65
HARv. L. REv. 288, 297 (1950).
60 Suppose a ladies' aid society serves junior-senior banquets, Kiwanis
luncheons, etc., in the church basement? If it is concluded that does not
eliminate the exemption, what about letting out the dormitory of an exempt
private college to parents and alumni attending commencement, during summer
months for conventions or conferences?
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triguing enough to stimulate the hope that some taxpayer will
some time find it worthwhile dollars-and-cents-wise to raise them.
Technicalities of record title or of formal legal capacity are not
of governing importance. In the Reynolds Memorial Hospital case,
the hospital owned none of the lots exempted. Title to some was
in a nursing school (itself probably qualified for exemption), to
others in trustees for a religious body (which, however, was not
shown to receive any benefit from their holding), but there were
still others whose title was individually in one of those trustees, not
subject to any trust instrument although shown by proof to be
held for the same trust purposes as the others in behalf of still
another religious organization which was equitable owner of all
the lots. Regardless of these variations in title, all were equally
held exempt, the opinion expressly asserting that the nature of
the use and not that of the title was the criterion.61 And the fact
that the hospital was not incorporated nor even an orthodox
charitable association functioning under a standard declaration
of trust02 but was wholly managed and controlled by the individual
"lot owner", thus having in strictness no separate legal existence,
was likewise no bar to exemption.
Again, the fact that the exemption beneficiary's bounty is
not extended to everybody, or to everybody gratuitously, does not
deprive it of tax immunity. Here we are not concerned, though
later we must be, with exemptability of enterprises operated for a
profit, but are dealing with those whose privileged position is con-
ditioned upon their activity's being eleemosynary. The Reynolds
Memorial Hospital case is again in point. So far as they were
financially able to pay, in the judgment of the hospital manager,
patients were received as pay patients, otherwise as charity patients.
But no one was refused admittance because of inability to pay and
no distinction was made on that basis in the treatment of those
admitted. Well over half, on the average, were charity patients
and there was regularly a large annual deficit, made good by volun-
tary contributions. Under the circumstances the reception of pay
patients did not negative exemption. In re Masonic Temple
01 Reynolds Memorial Hospital v. Marshall County Court, 78 W. Va.
685, 688, 90 S.E. 238, 239 (1916) ("The applicants do not seek exemption
from taxation on account of the title by which they hold the property, nor
the character of the authority to control it but for the reason that it is property
used for 'charitable purposes'. . . . It is the use to which the property is to
be applied that determines whether, or not it may be exempted from
taxation").
62 See W. VA. CODE c. 35, art. 2 (Michie, 1949) and especially § 6, con-
stituting the trustees of organizations qualifying under the article "a cor-
poration" with "all the privileges and powers of nonstock corporations".
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Societye3 rejected a suggestion that limitation of the benefits to a
restricted class, members of the organization (in the instant case
specifically to Masonic lodges) avoided the claim. That result
is of course reminiscent of the one applied in determinations re-
specting charitable trusts64 and it may be expected that the latter
affords a pattern for decisions in the analogous field of tax exemp-
tion in close cases.
On this record, the Supreme Court of Appeals cannot be
charged with an unsympathetic attitude toward public welfare
claims to tax exemption. Still, there is a reverse side to the coin.
Ferguson v. Townsend 65 settles that our liberality in the matter
of exemptions is distinctly intramural. There the privilege was
denied a Hampton Roads, Virginia, museum, as to West Virginia
property which under the then law would have been tax immune
if similarly held for a like institution having its operating situs
within our borders. The result, predicated on the idea that the
rationale of exemption is a reciprocal of benefit conferred on the
people of the state by the exemption beneficiary, seems to be in
line both with the prevailing rule elsgwhere 8 and with manifesta-
tions of the legislative will. 67 One can hardly reproach the court
for not adopting a position of superior moral elevation in this
matter from what West Virginia charities could expect to encoun-
ter abroad-yet it was ungracious to characterize the dwellers in
our ancient mother state as "foreign peoples"., A highly sophisti-
83 90 W. Va. 441, 111 S.E. 637 (1922).
84 See 3 Scorr ON TRUSTS §§ 875.1, 375.2 (1939); cf. Gallaher v. Gallaher,
106 W. Va. 588, 146 S.E. 623 (1929).
65 111 W. Va. 432, 162 S.E. 490, 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1168 (1932).
66 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1168 (1932).
67 A legislative attitude is clearly spelled out in the inheritance tax statute
which, from first enactment, limited its exemption of charitable bequests
to cases where the property transferred "is used for the purpose herein men-
tioned in this state", W. Va. Acts 1909, c. 63, § 2 (b), a qualification later
re-emphasized to read that it be "used exclusively in this state", W. Va. Acts
Ex. Sess. 1921. c. 3, § 2(b), in which form it continues, see W. VA. CODE C.
11, art. 11, § (e) (Michie, 1949), with a recent extension, W. Va. Acts 1951, c. 177
to allow similar treatment for a bequest which is to be used "for the sole bene-
fit of persons domiciled in this state" if that restriction is manifested in the
manner prescribed by the amendment. There is no reason to suppose that
the legislative will as to property tax exemptions differs from that declared as
to inheritance tax exemptions. Its elaboration in the latter, as contrasted with
the silence of the former, is explainable by the circumstances that the latter
is a much more modem statute with consequent greater refinement of drafts-
manship and that the court's construction in Ferguson v. Townsend dispensed
with any need for a legislative declaration. Indeed, the 1951 amendment cited,
in adopting a position adumbrated in that opinion, rather indicates both
legislative awareness of the opinion and concurrence in it both as to its holding
and as to the question impliedly reserved.
68 See Ferguson v. Townsend, II W. Va. 432, 436, 162 S.E. 490, 491 (1932)
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cated argument that residents were in fact specially benefited by
this extrastate institution was demolished with caustic accuracy; 69
but the very fact of its being answered in terms of the particular
case rather than broadly rejected leaves alive a possibility that an
outside activity may still qualify for exemption provided it ad-
duces dear and convincing proof that its holding of the property
involved enures peculiarly to the benefit of West Virginians.
It is the "trust deed" situation, however, which has vexed the
court most and oftenest and where, after an about-face, it has
established the most revealing limitation as to the operation of
exemptions. The issue involved is, whether use as a source of in-
come for an institution within the permissible category of public
welfare enterprises without other use made of property by the
institution is enough to sustain the exemption.-
So far as its intention might govern, the legislature said "yes"
in 1917, by a statutory provision setting up detailed administrative
safeguards requiring the tax commissioner's approval of the deed
of trust under which the income producing property was held.
70
The statute was initially accepted as valid and the court busied
itself with the matter of construing and applying the terms. Use
of the income to discharge debts was compatible with the existence
8o Id. at 439, 162 S.E. at 493 ("It is argued that the museum will benefit
the people of this state, because Hampton Roads is the state's chief harbor for
the shipment of coal, especially for coal from southern West Virginia. The
argument is that the coal industry in that part of the state will be stimulated
and the entire citizenship correspondingly benefited. We are not impressed
with that argument. There is now no lack of water transportation for coal at
Hampton Roads. The coal industry is suffering for want of markets and
adequate prices for its product, and not for transportation either by rail or
water").
70 W. Va. Acts 1917, c. 62 ("..and, provided, further, that such exemption
from taxation shall apply to all property, including the principal thereof, and
the income therefrom, held for a term of years or otherwise under a bona fide
deed of trust, transfer or assignment, by a trustee or trustees required by the
terms of such trust to apply, annually, the income derived from such property
to education, religion, charity, and cemeteries, when not used for private pur-
poses or profit. Such transfer or assignment shall be in writing and have the
approval of the state tax commissioner endorsed thereon; and a copy thereof
shall be filed in his office before such exemption shall apply to the property
embraced therein; and all books or papers showing the collection and distribu-
tion of money or property under or by virtue of any such trust shall be open
to the inspection of such commissioner, his deputies or assistants, at all reason-
able times. And, whenever from any cause, such commissioner shall determine
that any such trust is not bona fide, or that it was created or is carried on for
the purpose of evading taxation, then he shall withdraw his approval thereof
by written notice served upon any trustee in such trust, and thereafter all
property served by such trust shall be subject to taxation; but any person
beneficially interested may appeal from any such decision of said commissioner
to the circuit court of the county wherein the trustee resides, and if such
trustee reside outside the state of West Virginia, then to the circuit court of
the county wherein the seat of government is located; and with the further
right of appeal to the supreme court of appeals by any party to the proceedings").
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of the exemption where the debts arose out of loans to the trustees
for the prescribed institutional purpose and so served merely to
make funds available anticipatorily7' but incompatible where the
debts, though secured by encumbrances on the property, were
anterior to the trust which had never received from them anything
to apply to its charitable purposes.72  The cestui must be dispens-
ing its bounty in West Virginia or in special aid of West Virginians,
not elsewhere and at large., ' Instalment payments received on
account of a projected transfer of the trust property by the trustee,
whether construed as lease with option to purchase and apply or
conditional sales contract, were as operative as conventional rentals
to preserve the exemption.7 4 Prichard v. Kanawha County Court",-
ruled squarely and with elaborate reasoning in favor of the statute's
constitutionality while all the other cases cited assumed it.
Central Realty Co. v. Martin"8 held that the statute could not
constitutionally be applied under circumstances not distinguish-
able from those involved in the earlier cases. The Central Realty
Company decision remains the latest-and therefore g6verning-
expression of judicial doctrine. The legislature has acquiesced to
the extent of dropping the "trust deed" clause from the statute and
substituting other language 77 which probably78 should be taken
to paraphrase the Central Realty Company holding. The case is
thus of sufficient importance for the current law of tax exemption
to demand careful consideration of what it held, and beyond that,
of how it affects the general pattern of tax exemption in this state.
71 Prichard v. Kanawha County Court, 109 W. Va. 479, 155 S.E. 542 (1930).
72 State ex rel. Farr v. Martin., 105 W. Va. 600, 143 S.E. 356 (1928).
73 Ferguson v. Townsend, 111 W. Va. 432, 162 S.E. 490 (1932).
74 Patterson Memorial Fund v. James, 120 W. Va. 155, 197 S.E. 302 (1938).
75 109 W. Va. 479, 155 S,E. 542 (1930).
76 126 W. Va. 915, 30 S.E.2d 720 (1944), 50 W. VA. L.Q. 92 (1946).
77 W. Va. Acts 1945, c. 143 ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this
section, however, no language herein shall be construed to exempt from taxa-
tion any property owned by, or held in trust for, educational, literary, scientific,
religious or other charitable corporations or organizations, unless such property
is used primarily and immediately for the purposes of such corporations or
organizations").
78 The hedging, an instance of the writer's cautious if not ultraconservative
nature, is because the formula, "used primarily and immediately for the
purposes", originates not in the Central Realty case but in State ex rel. Farr
v. Martin, 105 W. Va. 600, 143 S.E. 356 (1928) where it was used to differentiate
the case where income was used to discharge antecedent encumbrances on the
property from the situation where it becomes available for application to the
charity's objects. The Central Realty case did, indeed, profess to rest on a
distillation of the principles derived from reading State ex rel. Farr v. Martin in
association with a couple of other (non-"trust deed") cases and mentioned the
"primarily and immediately" formula repeatedly in the opinion (though never
in the syllabus). The only syllabus reference to the formula is in State ex rel.
Farr v. Martin, which assumed the constitutionality of the "trust deed" provi-
sion and used "directly and immediately" as a rule for its interpretation. It
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As a focus of benevolence, redounding to the advantage of the
community, the charity involved in the Central Realty case had
perhaps something of an edge on those in the other cases. It was
an offshoot of an old-line nationally known benevolent association "9
which, it may be assumed, would attract outside subsidies and
visitors and make business for Elkins, where it operated, whereas
they seem without exception to have been those single donor
projects which so often languish as undernourished bids for in-
dividual immortality. This is not meant to impugn the propriety
of classifying their purposes as being within the terms of the
statute. As to that, we may accept, as did the court, the deter-
mination made by the tax commissioner in approving the trusts.
But it does suggest that the relative prospects of substantive benefits
to the people of the state was not an inarticulate premise influenc-
ing the difference in result.
The nature of the trust property from which the income de-
rived was substantially alike in all the cases. In all it was improved
real estate-indeed, in both State ex rel. Farr v. Martin" and
Central Realty Co. v. Martin, it was by a most improbable co-
incidence a Huntington hotel.
This aspect of the cases, while not of course providing any
basis for distinction, is of great relevance in settling the scope of
decision in the Central Realty case. Not only does the syllabus par-
ticularize "real estate" as not entitled to exemption,8 ' the opinion,
in its analysis of the "use" test, is meticulous to designate land as
the species of property whose physical use is distinct from the use
of the income.8 2  "We do not mean", says the court, "that the
exemption clause of the constitution should be applied with the
same rigor to all property... There are certain kinds of personal
property such as stocks, bonds, evidences of debt and other in-
tangibles where the income therefrom is sufficiently identical with
the use of the property that the use of the income is, in effect, the
might thus be argued that the amendment was designed as a legislative
confirmation only of State ex rel. Farr v. Martin andnot of Central Realty Co.
v. Martin; but, in view of the timing and of the concurrent dropping of the
"trust deed" clause from the exemption section, it seems to the writer
that, while such an argument might be textually admissible, it is inadmissible
in reason and that on any fair reading the statute must now be taken as in-
corporating the Central Realty Company doctrine, however inartistically.
70 The Odd Fellows Home.
80 105 W. Va. 600, 143 S.E. 356 (1928). This fact does not appear in the
report of the case but it is so stated in Prichard v. Kanawha County Court,
supra note 71.
81 Central Realty Co. v. Martin, supra note 76, at syllabus 1.
82 Id. at 921, 30 S.E.2d at 724.
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use of the property. But this does not hold true as to land",3
This is about as plain a warning as one can want against generaliz-
ing the conclusion of unconstitutionality to embrace all trusts of
income producing property whatever the property's kind. Super-
ficially the distinction seems to be between realty and personalty.
It is doubtful, however, that this is more than an approximation of
the line intended to be drawn. Some personalty, e.g., a fleet of
trucks, is as capable as any building of physical use and occupancy
distinct from income use. Some realty-very possibly any separate
ownership of mineral rights8 4 and certainly a lessor's interest under
a coal lease, s to mention locally important situations-is not. It
is submitted that a trust holding of the former would be denied
and one of the latter could be accorded the exemption under the
Central Realty doctrine. Clearly the specification of "stocks, bonds,
evidences of debt and other intangibles" implies that they and
other property ejusdem generis 6 fall outside the constitutional bar.
What then is the idem genus by which they are related? Despite
the expressions indicative of its being their personal property status,
it is believed that the really significant common element is their
practical incapacity for enjoyment by occupancy and the conse-
quent limitation of their use to use of the income from them.
This view is supported by the remark that "Land is corporeal,
albeit there are incorporeal rights connected therewith, but in
this case were are concerned with the use of a tangible and material
res",8 7 as well as by the opinion's recurrent emphasis on the "pri-
mary and immediate" use of property as opposed to a use of the
second order. The notorious poor enforcement of the personal prop-
erty tax, most scandalous as to moneys and credits, may blunt the
edge of this distinction in application (as no doubt it does ex-
plain why all the situations which arose under the "trust deed"
clause involved realty), but cannot alter the content of the hold-
ing. That holding, on my reading of the case, is that the exemp-
tion is unconstitutional insofar as the property held in trust is
readily capable of a use more direct than the use of its income, to
wit, physical occupancy and enjoyment, but not otherwise, and
83 Ibid.
84 On the nature of a landowner's title to mineral interests, see DONLEY,
LAw OF COAL, OIL AND GAs IN WEST VIRGINIA AND VIRGINIA §§ 1-3 (1951).
85 Id. at § 121a.
86 The ejusdem generis rule has been applied in connection with classifica-
tion of property for taxation, see Greene Line Terminal Co. v. Martin, 122 W. Va.
483, 492, 10 S.E.2d 901, 906 (1940).
87 Central Realty Co. v. Martin, 126 W. Va. 915, 921, 30 S.E.2d 720, 724
(1944).
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that a capacity for such more direct use is commonly present
where interests in realty are involved but less characteristically
so as to interests in personalty.
All this is to some extent speculative and. must now remain so.
The legislature, if not by the enactment of the "primarily and
immediately" amendment,s8 certainly by the excision of the trust
deed proviso, has swept away the whole exemption. Whatever
the constitution, as interpreted by the Central Realty case, may
direct, the code at present places realty and personalty, tangibles
and intangibles, all on the same plane-taxability if the charity's
interest is limited to receiving as cestui the income. As to all alike,
any mitigations derive from structural laxity in the assessment
process, not from a valid claim to exemption. The question
whether the constitutional position of Prichard v. Kanawha County
Court or that of Central Realty Co. v. Martin is right is there-
fore of no practical consequence.
More than that, it is pointless. Right by what standard?
If the question addresses itself to which view is in line with that
more generally prevailing elsewhere, "the weight of authority,"
the Central Realty doc1rine gets the nod.80 Probably that is true,
too, if the test is which comes closer to what the draftsmen of the
constitutional provision contemplated. Our examination of the
extant materials, while it shed little light on what notions they
entertained about the tax provisions, did show that they were
looking to contemporary customs and practices as the measure
of what they had embraced in the category of permissible exemp-
tions. 0 Undoubtedly they deliberately rejected the legislative
latitude given by the Virginia constitution as it then stood; but,
being, like all of us, children of their time and place, they could
hardly escape the context of their Virginia culture in appraising
what those contemporary customs and practices were. It there-
fore seems appropriate to look to the Virginia situation, not as
constituting legal authority but as a cultural matrix. Prichard v.
Kanawha County Court undertook to do that, leaning heavily on
Virginia materials and particularly on Petersburg v. Petersburg
Benevolent Mechanic's Ass'n.91  That case held squarely enough
that tax exemption appertained to property as to which the
sSsupra note 77.
89 See Howard University v. District of Columbia, 155 F.2d 10, 12 (D.C.
Cir. 1946); 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 20, § 686; Note, 64 HARV. L. Rzv. 288, 294
(1950). The Central Realty case disclaims reliance on this particular basis of
support, however, 126 W. Va. at 920, 30 S.E.2d at 723.
9o Supra page 172 at note 7.
0178 Va. 431 (1884).
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charity's interest was that of income recipient. But it was de-
cided in 1884 and even the statute there involved was not enacted
until 1877 whereas the West Virginia constitutional provision is
a product of 1863. With nothing better to go on, the passage of
fifteen or twenty years might indeed legitimately be dismissed
as insufficient to bring about a change in general understanding
regarding the appropriate range for tax exemption. But there
is something better and it points to the Central Realty result. A
proviso to the real property92 tax exemption section as it stood just
prior to separation read, "that nothing herein contained shall be
construed to exempt from taxation any lot or building partially
or wholly used as a residence, or for any private purpose".93 A
primitive formulation of the Central Realty doctrine was thus
officially evidenced as the received understanding as to the ap-
propriate scope of exemption and seems to have an excellent claim
to show what the constitutional framers thought to be normal
practise. Insofar as the question is which decision is better sup-
ported by authority, either the authority of judicial opinion else-
where or the authority of the intention of the framers of the con-
stitution to the extent that is discernible, the Central Realty case
seems to be indicated.
Unwilling to rest on these adequate but humble formal
grounds, that opinion essayed to establish a substantive basis as well.
The attempt is not quite convincing. One gropes for enlightenment
in a compound fog of linguistics and economics. "The word
'used' ", we are told, "means exactly what is there said", but that
hardly helps, there being numerous alternative senses of the word "4
among which choice may be made.9 5 The problems involved in
the concepts of property as the origin of a flow of goods and
92 Unlike the West Virginia provision, which deals with real property and
personal property exemptions in one consolidated section, the Virginia statutes
at the time of separation treated them separately. Those as to personal
property were organized on so different a plan as to have no relevance and
only the real property exemptions are pertinent.
93 VA. CODE C. 35, § 36 (1860). Italics supplied.
94 The 1944 edition of Webster's unabridged dictionary gives nine senses
of "use" as a transitive verb.
95 Capacity for multiple meanings, unaccompanied by guidance as to which
applied, has been suggested as the criterion of "ambiguity in a statute or other
instrument", see State v. Harden, 62 W. Va. 313, 315, 58 S.E. 715, 716 .(19.07)
(syllabus 13). On the general problem of the need for choice in assiguing
meaning to statutory words and the shortcomings of the "plain meaning"
approach, see 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrsON §§ 4502,
4503 (3d ed. 1943).
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services in specie or the origin of a flow of income 96 are noticed97
but the relevance of the distinction is left to assertion without
demonstration. Some familar types of property are capable,
others incapable of use otherwise than for the production of in-
come, we are told, and therefore (so the court seems to conclude)
income-producing use of the latter must be enough to sustain ex-
emption while such use of the former is not enough to meet the
constitutional test of use. The logic is faulty. Suppose we grant the
accuracy of the observation as to differences between kinds of prop-
erty in the modes of use possible, the correctness of the premise that
the constitution by speaking generally of "property used" for
designated purposes implies that no species of property was wholly
proscribed as a potential object of exemption, and the conclusion
that property capable of no use other than income production
to escape such proscription must be allowed to be exempted as
to that income producing use. That property which is capable
of other use is not to be allowed to be similarly exempted does
not follow, as the court seems to have assumed it did. "Property
used", as a verbal formula, if comprehensive as to "property" is
also comprehensive as to "used"; and the limitation read into the
latter because of observed variances in the members constituting
the former nicely illustrates the common vice of rendering negatives
too casually pregnant.
The trouble with the opinion is that it undertakes to estab-
lish a logical foundation and does not deliver. This means only
that the conclusion was not supported by sufficient reasons. After
what was just said, it should be needless to state that this does
not suggest that it could not be, far less that reason demanded the
contrary result. There one gets beyond the operations of formal
logic into the factors influencing selection of major premises,
vulgarly nicknamed policy questions. As to them, it has latterly
OBEconomists do not usually discuss the matter in just this way but
analogous distinctions in various formulations are a staple of economic dis-
course, see e.g., FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME 22 (1906) ("wealth"
and "property"); I TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 84 (1911) ("capital" and
"capital goods"). For an elaborate classification, collating this with other bases
of distinction, consult NoYEs, THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY 458 (1936). The
text's imputation of intellectual ancestry may of course be disclaimed and the
alternative of professional conceptual inbreeding, from sources such as the
classical legal notions about corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments, see 2 BL.
CoMM. *20, plausibly preferred. Even so, no apology is offered for showing
kinship of ideas with those entertained by another discipline whose thinking
about the matter has been more rigorous than has ours.
0 See Central Realty Co. v. Martin, 126 W. Va. at 921, 30 S.E.2d at 724.
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been the intellectual fashion to frown upon tax exemptions. 0
Diffidence in translating one's predilections into axioms, how-
ever commendable, is always rare. My own bias is to leave such
choice of policies largely to the legislature as being the represent-
ative organ, duly recognizing nevertheless that our fundamental
arrangements of rigid constitutions and of judicial review presup-
pose that under some circumstances the judiciary shall discard the
legislative choice in favor of its own. That spells neither ap-
proval nor disapproval of the result in the particular case. Even
if it did, that would be beside the point. Nothing that has come
to my attention indicates that any one is or ought to be especially
concerned with my conclusions as to the proper evaluation of the
interests pressing for recognition. But an analysis-descriptively,
not critically-of the court's evaluation of them in the whole
series of cases is essential to any understanding of the law of tax
exemptions. Indeed, in any proper sense, that is the law of tax
exemptions.
The competing claims and demands involved in tax con-
troversies are perhaps sufficiently indicated by Holmes' famous
characterization of taxes as the price the individual pays for civiliza-
tion.9 9 The interest of the taxpayer in keeping his personal share
of the outlay as low as possible is obviously an individual interest
of substance and more specifically an interest in property, The
state as purveyor of the "civilization" asserts representatively the
whole range of public and social interests. 101
When it comes to exemptions, the analysis becomes more com-
plex. On the assumption that the quantum of "civilization" which
a community with a particular culture demands must still be sup-
plied and must still be paid for, the question resolves itself into how
far the state in recognizing others as its surrogates to provide
portions of it shall in return relieve them of a share of the general
burden and correspondingly redistribute it to bear more heavily
on the rest of the population. The latter's interest continues
98 See, e.g., Killough, Exemptions to Educational, Philanthropic and Re-
ligious Organizations in TAX EXEMPrIONs 23 (Tax Policy League Symposium
1939); Stimson, The Exemption of Property from Taxation in the United
States, 18 MINN. L. REV. 411 (1934).
99 See 2 HOLMES-LASKI LErras 1247 (1953)
100 But see STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 491 (1946). For
a systematic discussion of the interest in property as an individual interest of
substance, see POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW c. 5 (1922).
An extensive list of citations to illustrative materials will be found id., OUTLINE
OF LrCTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 99 (5th ed. 1943).
101As to these dcsses of interests, see Pound, A Survey of Social Interests,
57 H v. L. REv. 1 (1943), A Survey of Public Interests, 58 id. 909 (1945).
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to be the same interest as before, i.e., the general taxpayer's in-
dividual interest of substance, of property, larger in size because
of the diminished divisor, but no different in kind. There is
regularly and basically opposed to this the competing range of social
and public interests, now marshalled in support of the claim to
tax exemption instead of the original claim to taxes. In the pri-
mary taxpayer-tax collector situation, the preference almost uni-
versally is given to the interests represented by the latter.10 2 In
the taxpayer-tax exemptee variant, this near universality dis-
appears and courts often manifest a disposition to reverse the
preference. 10 3 No doubt this traces partly to the simple increase
in size of the taxpayer's claim but a great deal more seems at-
tributable to a discounting of the genuineness or substantiality of
the social (or-less frequently-public) interests asserted against
it. Disallowances of exemption because of disparagement of the
type of benevolence performed or insufficient generality in the
recipients of the bounty or the commingling of compensated and
gratuitous activity and the like represent judgments that the
social interests asserted by the exemption claimant are not signifi-
cant enough to prevail. As has been seen, our court is slow to
make that judgment and readier than many courts of last resort to
accept the legislative judgment on that point. If enhancement
of its tax burden is the only disadvantage the taxpayer can show
it sustains because of the exemption, the attitude has been and very
likely will continue to be to subordinate that consideration and
uphold the exemption. 0 4
But some taxpayers as to some exemption claims experience an
opposition of interests more particularized than merely how the
residual costs of "civilization" left for the government's provision
shall be shared. If the exemption claimed is incident to owner-
102 Such commonplaces of judicial discourse as that the judiciary will
only interfere with exercises of the legislative power to levy and collect taxes
in case of clear violation of some constitutional provision or some fundamental
concept of government and that the burden of proof to establish the incorrect-
ness of an assessment rests on the taxpayer verbalize this attitude.
103 Such commonplaces of judicial discourse as that taxation is the rule
and exemption the exception verbalize this attitude. Like other judicial policy
determinations, this, although unrelated to semantic operations, is often dis-
guised as a principle of statutory construction, see 2 CooLaY, op. cit. supra
note 20, § 672.
104 However, Ferguson v. Townsend, 111 W. Va. 432, 162 S.E. 490 (1932)
did make a deliberate judgment that extrastate charitable activities did not
promote social or public interests of sufficient moment to the state to support
their claim to exemption under generic terms. This is the only limitation of
the attitude mentioned in the text which has thus far been disclosed by our
court.
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ship of an enterprise which puts the taxpayer and the exemption
claimant in competition for compensated patronage, claims and
demands besides those described in the preceding paragraph are
affected. The exemption claimant's position may not, indeed, be
significantly different. There may be an increment of individual in-
terests to the social (or public) interests it asserts but these it
asserts no differently than and with no superior pretensions to
any purely private entrepreneur. The taxpayer's position is
changed in this context, however. 'True, the interest asserted by
the taxpayer may still be classified as an individual interest and
even an individual interest of substance but it is no longer con-
fined to the interest in property. It expands to embrace other
branches of individual interests of substance-the interest in free-
dom of industry and contract and the interest in advantageous
relations with others.105 Alertness in protection of these interests
has played a chief part in the furtherance of the economic and
social values popularly spoken of as freedom of competition or,
by metonymy, "the American way". Our court's commitment to
that aspect of our culture (therein faithfully reflecting the feeling
of major segments of the population) is sufficiently intense that a
taxpayer, asserting claims or demands in which are associated with
an interest in property the further interests in freedom of industry
and contract and in advantageous relations with others, may fair-
ly expect a sympathetic valuing of the interests he asserts.
Hence, when the individual's role becomes, instead of that of
a taxpayer trying to scale down his "civilization" bill by assailing
the social (or public) interests urged by the exemption claimant,
that of an entrepreneur setting up the claims and demands ap-
propriate to that capacity, against one occupying a sheltered com-
petitive position by virtue of a tax exemption, the new role as-
sumes dominant importance. The social and public interests
represented by the exemption claimant may be quite unchanged.
Their evaluation, with our court so high they will almost always
prevail as against a taxpayer's mere interest of property, is not
high enough to subdue this new opposition. They have met more
than their match. Our court's attitude is not unique-witness,
as a relatively well-known recent parallel the amendment of the
federal income law by Congress to expunge the exemption of cor-
porate business activities of eleemosynary institutions.100 Never-
theless it is evident and affords an organizing principle which re-
10 See POUND, OUTINE OF LECrumes ON JURSIPRUDENCF 101 (5th ed. 1943).
106 Revenue Act of 1950, § 301, 64 STAT. 947 (1950).
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conciles virtually our whole case law of property tax exemptions
-both the usual liberality in applying legislative exemption grants
and the sharp limitation in Greene Line Terminal Co. v. Martin
and Central Realty Co. v. Martin. The common element of those
two otherwise dissimilar cases, appearing also in State v. McDowell
Lodge No. 112, A.F. 8- A.M., will be seen to be the functioning of
the exemption claimant as a business competitor of taxpayers.
These are significantly the only cases where domesticated social
or public interests have had to give way. Rejection in the 1873
constitutional convention of the committee proposal favoring
producer-owned goods during the year of production suggests the
operation of the same sentiment, evidencing the consistency of
the court's position with a value pattern continuous since the
the state's beginnings.
0 7
The few cases that might be urged against this analysis raise
objections which are apparent rather than real. All allowed the
exemption in situations superficially incompatible with it. One,
Chapman v. Huntington Housing Authority,0 8 reached a truly con-
trary result but is easily accommodated as involving an instance
where state policy was made to yield to the superior compulsions
of the federal system. In State v. Kittle, no such constraint existed
but the competitive effect of the exemption grant was de minimis
or even slighter. The case involved a single single-family residence
in a country village and even at that sanctioned exemption only
for a temporary participation in the rental market incidental to
starting or winding up a holding for a non-market use. Read as a
whole, qualifications together with case disposition, rather than
challenging it re-enforces the general analysis. 09 Mountain View
Cemetery Co. v. Massey and In re Mountain State College, Inc.,
Assessmentllo call for closer reading. Both involved exemptions of
property, in the first case of a cemetery, in the second of a com-
mercial college, devoted permanently and regularly to the conduct
for a profit of the exemption claimant's business. In neither was
107 The continuity was no doubt broken pro tanto by the line of cases which
the Central Realty case afterwards overruled and the legislation on which they
rested but the latent possibilities of conflict betwen that line of cases and the
co-existing decisions in the Greene Line and McDowell Lodge No. 112 cases seems
not to have occurred to the court, so that the Central Realty decision would seem
to have corrected an aberration from what was all along the basic principle.
108 121 W. Va. 319, 3 S.E.2d 502 (1939).
109 Intimations in the opinion that it may rest on a differential valuation
of religious activities even more highly than the valuation of social interests
promoted by secular agencies, together with the risk that such a differentiation
might raise federal constitutional difficulties as an establishment of religion,
have been noted in the discussion of this case.
110 117 W. Va. 819, 188 S.E. 480 (1936).
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there any federal connection. In both, exemption was allowed,
without limitation except that the property be genuinely held
for and employed in the exempting use. It will be observed
that in both the business affected is atypical, out of the main
stream of a market economy. The great preponderance of edu-
cational activity clearly and of cemetery operation traditionally
and perhaps even currently is on a not-for-profit basis. Unlike
the rental real estate field-and, a fortiori, hotel operation-they
involve situations where equalization of competitors is to be made
in a population nearly all of whose members enjoy tax exemp-
tion rather than one nearly all of whose members have no par-
ticular basis for claiming an exemption. In such a setting, the
interests in freedom of industry and contract and in advantageous
relations with others will be given primacy by generalizing the
exemption, not as in the more familiar case by generalizing tax
liability. Recognition of exempt status for the commercial under-
takings in the Mountain View Cemetery and Mountain State Col-
lege cases does not impeach, therefore, the conclusion that the
court's high evaluation of those interests is of controlling impor-
tance. It illustrates and confirms it.
The primary purpose of this article has been to inquire what the
West Virginia law of property taxation is, which means, what can
be predicted with reasonable confidence as to the probable dis-
position of future claims to exemption? The answer has been
deemed to require a comprehensive review of the prior determin-
ations in the field and a systematic appraisal of them according
to some useful frame of reference. Such a frame of reference has
been found in the scheme of interests delineated by Pound. A
seondary purpose, indeed, has been to demonstrate the relevance
of a broad jurisprudential approach for articulating the hetero-
geneous particularities of case law. This, in other words, is a
detailed working out in one small area of insights afforded by a
study of jurisprudence. It is not intended to suggest that the
particular jurisprudential approach selected is uniquely capable
of giving fruitful results. It is emphatically not intended to
express (or imply) any criticism, either favorable or adverse, of the
content of the law or, what says the same thing, of the relative
weight given by the court to competing interests. Evaluation is
the court's function. Mine is description. It has been discharged
by an examination whose results may be summarized thus: To the
social (or public) interests represented by exemption claimants,
a very high value is attached-but not the highest. They are
30
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [1953], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol55/iss3/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
strong enough to prevail against a property interest merely,
which is what a taxpayer qua taxpayer asserts."11 They take second
place to the interests in freedom of industry and contract and in
advantageous relations with others which are relevant where grant
or denial of exemption would modify the conditions of competi-
tion as between exemption claimant and other sellers"1 2 in the
same market.
111 The statement has to do with the character of the competing interests,
not with the matter of the formal parties to the litigation. The adverse litigant
appearing against the exemption claimant may be and often is the state or an
official, and conversely the formal assertion of the exemption claimant's claims
may be tendered on its behalf by an official, sued by a taxpayer.
"2 The court seems to have been sensitive only to competition among sellers
in disregard of competition among buyers. In thus concentrating on the supply
and correspondingly neglecting the demand features of competition, it follows
what seems to be the current convention in popular and journalistic discussions
of competition.
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